An in-depth analysis of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) initiatives, foundational reports, and strategic recommendations for protecting submarine fiber-optic cables and seabed energy pipelines against gray-zone coercion.
1. HCSS Initiative: The Indo-Pacific Policy Dialogue
On November 12, 2026, HCSS announced an online policy dialogue titled Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities for EU Cooperation with South and Southeast Asia, scheduled for December 9, 2026 (10:00–11:00 CET).
- Cross-Regional Policy Bridge: Organized under the HCSS Europe in the Indo-Pacific programme and moderated by Programme Coordinator Benedetta Girardi, the panel unites European security researchers with Indo-Pacific experts from CSIS Indonesia and India’s Observer Research Foundation (ORF).
- Strategic Objective: The initiative translates Europe’s post-Nord Stream and Baltic Sea infrastructure-protection lessons—such as the EU Cable Security Toolbox and Global Gateway—into actionable frameworks for South and Southeast Asia. It focuses on maritime domain awareness, gray-zone sabotage deterrence, and public-private coordination across major shipping chokepoints.
- Companion Event Track: The webinar is part of a broader November 2026 HCSS push regarding Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI), aligning with its companion event announcement Protecting the Invisible Lifelines (released November 17, 2026) and ongoing research into maritime gray-zone coercion around Taiwan.
2. Foundational 2025 Reports & Companion Studies
The analytical backbone of HCSS’s late 2026 Indo-Pacific dialogues stems from a primary joint policy report published in late 2025, alongside targeted regional studies:
Core Joint Report (December 11, 2025)
Response and Resilience: Government Strategies for Securing Subsea Infrastructure in Europe and Asia, co-published by HCSS and Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), authored by Benedetta Girardi and Sean Tan. Stemming from an October 2025 workshop in Singapore, this report compares European and Asian vulnerability profiles, regulatory gaps, and crisis-response protocols.
Taiwan Subsea Resilience Study (March 2025)
Strengthening Taiwan’s Sea Cable Security examines single-point-of-failure risks for island networks, recurring anchor-dragging incidents around offshore islands like Matsu, and emergency satellite backup architectures.
Middle-Power Maritime Security (December 2025)
Bridging Waters: Strengthening Europe’s Maritime Security Engagement analyzes how European naval and diplomatic initiatives can support subsea cable protection across contested sea lanes in the South China Sea and Red Sea.
3. Core Views & Recommendations: Deterrence by Denial
Core Strategic Views
- Extreme Geographic Chokepoints: Over 95% of intercontinental digital communications converges through narrow, shallow waterways (Luzon Strait, South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, Red Sea, and waters around Taiwan/Japan), magnifying exposure to both natural hazards and deliberate interference.
- Gray-Zone Ambiguity & Plausible Deniability: Because 150–200 global subsea cable faults occur annually from commercial anchors and trawlers, state actors can disguise sabotage as routine accidents, creating severe attribution hurdles.
- Public-Private Governance Divide: Cables are privately owned and operated, while naval patrolling rests with states. Limited real-time intelligence sharing slows early warning capabilities.
- Repair Vessel Scarcity & Permitting Bottlenecks: A small, aging global fleet of specialized repair ships—combined with slow coastal-state permitting in contested waters—can turn an isolated cut into a prolonged strategic outage.
Key Recommendations
HCSS argues that deterrence by denial—reducing the operational payoff of cutting a cable—is highly effective against gray-zone sabotage. Their key technical and policy remedies include:
| Strategic Pillar | Indo-Pacific Vulnerability | HCSS Policy & Technical Remedy |
|---|---|---|
| Maritime Domain Awareness | Dense commercial traffic masks deliberate anchor drags and seabed reconnaissance. | Fuse naval/coast guard AIS with private operator telemetry, Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS), and SMART cables to detect seabed anomalies. |
| Repair Capacity & Permitting | Limited regional repair ships and slow coastal-state permitting in contested waters. | Expand allied-flagged vessel capacity, pre-negotiate emergency maintenance corridors, and establish naval escort protocols for repair ships. |
| Network Topology | Over-reliance on shallow straits (e.g., Luzon, Malacca) and single-landing spurs. | Co-finance geographically diversified routes (trans-Pacific, Arctic, overland Middle Corridor) and harden Cable Landing Stations (CLS). |
| Cross-Regional Governance | Fragmented oversight across private consortia, ASEAN, Quad, and European bodies. | Link EU (Global Gateway, EU Cable Security Toolbox) and NATO CUI coordination mechanisms with Indo-Pacific partners (Quad, AUKUS, ASEAN, Japan, Taiwan). |
4. About The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) is an independent defense, security, and geopolitical think tank headquartered in The Hague, the Netherlands.
- Founding & Leadership: Founded in 2007 by Professor Dr. Rob de Wijk alongside specialists from TNO, RAND, Clingendael, and the Dutch Ministry of Defence. It is currently led by Executive Director Paul Sinning and Director of Research Dr. Tim Sweijs.
- Operating Model: Operating on a contract-research and advisory model, HCSS conducts commissioned policy studies, risk assessments, and crisis simulations for the Dutch government, EU institutions, NATO, allied governments, and private-sector operators.
- Core Research Programmes: Focus areas include Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) & Maritime Security, Defense Policy & Gray-Zone Deterrence, Crisis Simulation & Wargaming (ARENA), and Emerging Technology & Resource Geopolitics.
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