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On October 29, 2026 (released November 5, 2026), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) unanimously adopted a sweeping Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 26-74) in IB Docket No. 23-119 and MD Docket No. 23-134, replacing decades-old passive licensing with a continuous lifecycle security regime for international Section 214 authorizations—and forming the international half of a coordinated regulatory pincer alongside the April 2026 Domestic Section 214 NPRM (FCC 26-29).
5% Threshold
Lowers direct and indirect equity/voting disclosure thresholds from 10% to 5%, while retaining automatic Team Telecom referral at 10% foreign ownership.
30-Day Filings
Replaces the proposed 10-year renewal cycle with mandatory electronic reporting via ICFS within 30 days of any material change in ownership, borders, or vendors.
1-Year / 3-Month
Requires baseline cybersecurity certification within one year, service launch within one year of grant, and mandatory surrender after three months of non-use.
Facilities Mapping
Mandates technical and access disclosures for U.S.–Canada and U.S.–Mexico land-border facilities, including data centers, PoPs, and peering points.
Third-Party & Resale
Requires disclosure of any third-party service provider or backend vendor linked to a foreign adversary, as well as granular mapping of resale pathways.
Hardware Freeze
Bans adding any hardware on the FCC’s Covered List to networks or underlying infrastructure, freezing all future expansion of high-risk technology.
Historically, an international Section 214 authorization under 47 CFR Part 63 functioned as a one-time regulatory gateway that remained valid indefinitely with minimal post-grant scrutiny. Unanimously approved by Chairman Brendan Carr and Commissioners Anna Gomez and Olivia Trusty, The International Section 214 Report and Order (FCC 26-74) concludes the Commission’s 2023 Evolving Risks proceeding by establishing continuous regulatory visibility into carrier ownership, land-border interconnection facilities, third-party vendors, and supply-chain hardware.
1. Core Pillars of the International Section 214 Report and Order (FCC 26-74)
A. Granular Ownership Transparency: The 5% Disclosure Threshold
- Lowered Reporting Baseline: All initial international Section 214 applications, modifications, assignments, and transfers of control must disclose direct or indirect equity and voting interest holders at a 5% threshold (reduced from 10%).
- U.S. Public Company Exception: Applicants are exempt from reporting 5% to less than 10% ownership interests held through a U.S. publicly traded corporation—or in an applicant that is itself a U.S. publicly traded entity—unless the applicant has actual knowledge of those interest holders.
- Team Telecom Referral Mechanics: Automatic referral to Executive Branch national security agencies ("Team Telecom") remains triggered at 10% or greater foreign ownership. However, the FCC retains broad discretion to refer lower-threshold filings and will generally refer any application disclosing a third-party service provider linked to a foreign adversary. (Note: Submarine cable landing license applications retain their existing 10% reporting baseline.)
B. U.S.–Canada & U.S.–Mexico Cross-Border Facilities Mapping
To eliminate blind spots at terrestrial international gateways, facilities-based applicants and authorization holders must submit granular technical disclosures for every cross-border facility used to transport common-carrier or non-common-carrier traffic across the U.S.–Canada and U.S.–Mexico land borders, including data centers, Points of Presence (PoPs), and peering facilities housing ingress/egress routers or switches:
- Technical & Routing Identifiers: Physical street address, facility owner, data center colocation status, public vs. private peering designation, Internet Protocol (IP) prefixes, and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs).
- Hardware & Personnel Access Vetting: Identification of principal traffic-forwarding hardware—explicitly flagging any equipment produced or provided by a Foreign Adversary or an entity on the FCC Covered List—as well as disclosure of whether any person linked to or physically located in a foreign-adversary jurisdiction has physical or remote access to the facility.
- Inability-to-Verify Safe Harbor: Where a carrier cannot verify third-party equipment or access inside a shared multi-tenant facility, it may certify its inability to verify, explain why, and report strictly on its own equipment and operations.
- Presumptive Confidentiality & Direct Agency Sharing: Cross-border facility data is treated as presumptively confidential but may be shared directly with Team Telecom without standard pre-notification procedures (with notice provided upon sharing).
C. Third-Party Service Providers & Resale Disclosures
- Infrastructure & Wholesale Mapping: Applicants must specify whether services run over owned facilities, Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs), leased circuits, or resale. Resale-only applicants must identify underlying wholesale/intermediary carriers, mobile network operators (for MVNOs), and Call Detail Record (CDR) retention practices.
- Public Disclosure of Foreign-Adversary Vendors: Carriers must disclose whether they use or plan to use any third-party service provider that is owned, controlled, or directed by a foreign adversary, listed on the FCC Covered List, or capable of accessing the carrier’s network or records from a foreign-adversary country. Unlike border facility filings, these vendor disclosures are not presumptively confidential and trigger routine referral to Team Telecom.
D. Routine Conditions, Cybersecurity & Covered List Hardware Freeze
- Baseline Cybersecurity Program: New applicants must certify upon filing—and existing authorization holders must implement and certify within one year—that they maintain baseline cybersecurity controls protecting facilities and systems supporting international services.
- Covered List Equipment Freeze: Authorization holders are prohibited from adding equipment or services on the FCC Covered List (under producer/provider determinations) and must certify that neither they nor the owners of the underlying facilities they utilize will add such gear. While the order stops short of a retroactive "rip-and-replace" mandate for existing hardware, it freezes all future expansion.
- Character & Multi-License Accountability: Carriers must certify whether they have committed un-remediated material violations of the Communications Act, national security rules, or false statements to federal agencies, and must justify holding more than one international Section 214 authorization.
E. Continuous Lifecycle Oversight & Dormant License Revocations
- Updated One-Time Information Collection: All existing international Section 214 holders must complete a mandatory baseline collection covering 5% ownership, cross-border facilities, third-party vendors, and new cybersecurity/Covered List certifications.
- 30-Day Material Change Reporting: Authorization holders must notify the FCC electronically via the International Communications Filing System (ICFS) within 30 days of any material change to reported ownership, cross-border facilities, services, covered vendors, or certifications.
- Use-It-or-Lose-It Operational Rules: Newly authorized carriers must commence service within one year of grant (and file notice within 30 days of launch). Discontinuing service for three consecutive months triggers mandatory license surrender under 47 CFR § 63.19, while transfers of control must explicitly report associated International Signaling Point Codes (ISPCs) under 47 CFR § 63.24(g).
- Streamlined Revocation of Prior Non-Responders: Establishes an expedited public-notice revocation procedure to cancel authorizations of inactive carriers that failed to respond to the FCC’s earlier 2023–2024 Evolving Risks data collection.
2. The Accompanying Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM)
Alongside the binding rules in the International Section 214 Order (FCC 26-74), the Commission issued a forward-looking FNPRM proposing an even stricter set of structural prohibitions aimed at harmonizing international Section 214 rules with the FCC’s Submarine Cable Modernization Orders:
1. Presumption of Denial & Disqualification
Proposes codifying a formal regulatory presumption of denial for international Section 214 applications filed by foreign adversary–controlled entities or Covered List entities, alongside additional presumptive disqualifying conditions.
2. Ban on Capacity Leasing & IRUs
Proposes prohibiting international Section 214 holders from leasing capacity, entering into Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs), or providing network access to Covered List entities and foreign adversaries.
3. Global Facility Mapping & Personnel Bans
Proposes requiring disclosure of all U.S. and foreign facilities, prior FCC approval before serving foreign-adversary countries, and a strict ban on individuals tied to or located in adversary nations accessing principal equipment or U.S. records.
4. Officer-Signed Plans & 72-Hour Incident Reporting
Seeks comment on requiring annual cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans signed by a senior corporate officer, plus mandatory cyber incident reporting within 72 hours (aligned with CIRCIA standards).
3. Regulatory Evolution: Legacy Part 63 vs. FCC 26-74
| Regulatory Dimension | Legacy Part 63 Regime | Adopted Report & Order (FCC 26-74) |
Proposed FNPRM Next Steps |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oversight Model | Indefinite duration with minimal post-grant review. | Continuous oversight via baseline collection + 30-day material-change filings. | Expanded modification rules and automated revocation triggers. |
| Ownership Threshold | 10% direct/indirect equity or voting interest. | 5% threshold (with U.S. public company exception); 10% auto-referral to Team Telecom. | Presumption of denial for foreign-adversary or Covered List ownership. |
| Border & Facility Vetting | High-level service summary; no systematic land-border mapping. | Detailed disclosures of U.S.–Canada & U.S.–Mexico cross-border PoPs, ASNs, IP prefixes, and gear. | Disclosure of all U.S. & foreign facilities; prior approval to serve adversary states. |
| Supply Chain & Capacity | Ad hoc Team Telecom review only if 10%+ foreign ownership existed. | Public disclosure of foreign-adversary vendors; ban on adding Covered List equipment. | Ban on leasing capacity / IRUs to Covered List or foreign-adversary entities. |
| Cybersecurity & Staffing | Case-by-case mitigation agreements for foreign-owned carriers. | Mandatory baseline cybersecurity program within 1 year; character certifications. | Officer-signed risk plans; 72-hour cyber reporting; ban on adversary staff access. |
| Dormant Authorizations | Inactive "shelf" licenses rarely purged. | 1-year launch deadline; mandatory surrender after 3 months of non-use (§ 63.19). | Ongoing enforcement and administrative forfeitures. |
4. Relationship with the April 2026 Domestic NPRM (FCC 26-29): A Coordinated Regulatory Pincer
Notably, on April 30, 2026, the Commission voted unanimously (3–0) to advance a sweeping Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service (WC Docket No. 26-82; FCC 26-29), that would bar Covered List carriers—including China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom—from operating data centers and Points of Presence (PoPs) in the United States, while prohibiting U.S. carriers from interconnecting with entities on the national security “Covered List,” including at facilities such as data centers, gateways, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) owned by those entities. Following the close of its public comment cycle, the April 2026 NPRM remains pending final adoption as a binding Report and Order.
Procedurally, the November 2026 International Section 214 Order (FCC 26-74) is not part of the April 2026 Domestic Section 214 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 26-29). Rather, they are two distinct, parallel proceedings administered by separate FCC bureaus targeting complementary halves of Section 214 of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 214):
- The International Track (FCC 26-74): Administered by the Office of International Affairs in IB Docket No. 23-119, finalizing the April 2023 Evolving Risks rulemaking governing U.S.–foreign border crossings under 47 CFR Part 63.
- The Domestic Track (FCC 26-29): Administered by the Wireline Competition Bureau in WC Docket No. 26-82 (adopted April 30, 2026; published at 91 FR 25325 on May 8, 2026), targeting automatic “blanket” domestic interstate operating authority under 47 CFR § 63.01.
| Attribute | International Section 214 Order (FCC 26-74) | April 2026 Domestic NPRM (FCC 26-29) |
|---|---|---|
| Administering Bureau & Docket | Office of International Affairs (IB Docket No. 23-119 / MD Docket No. 23-134) | Wireline Competition Bureau (WC Docket No. 26-82) |
| Procedural Status | Adopted Final Rules (released Nov. 5, 2026) + accompanying International FNPRM | Pending Proposed Rulemaking (comment record closed; awaiting final Report & Order) |
| Statutory Target | International § 214 authorizations (lines crossing U.S. international borders) | Blanket Domestic § 214 authority under 47 CFR § 63.01 (U.S. interstate transmission) |
| Core Security Mechanism | Continuous lifecycle vetting: 5% ownership reporting, U.S.–Canada/Mexico cross-border PoP disclosures, Covered List gear freeze, and baseline cybersecurity mandates | Physical & logical isolation inside the U.S.: revoking blanket domestic authority for Covered List entities, banning U.S. data center PoP cages, and prohibiting carrier BGP/MMR interconnection |
Following the 2021–2022 revocation of their international Section 214 authorizations, Chinese state-owned carriers (such as China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile) continued maintaining physical Points of Presence (PoPs), colocation cages, and domestic backhaul links inside U.S. carrier-neutral data centers under residual blanket domestic authority or non-common-carrier peering arrangements.
- Securing the Border Gateway (FCC 26-74): Locks down international entry points by requiring granular reporting of cross-border PoPs and routers, banning the addition of Covered List equipment, and proposing (via its FNPRM) to bar international licensees from leasing capacity or IRUs to foreign-adversary entities.
- Severing the Domestic Handoff (FCC 26-29): Locks down the domestic interior by stripping Covered List entities of blanket domestic Section 214 authority, subjecting individual applications to a rebuttable presumption of denial modeled directly on the FCC’s Submarine Cable Modernization Orders, and proposing to bar U.S.-operating carriers and data center Meet-Me Rooms from interconnecting with Covered List networks.
- Forced Offshore Beach Demarcations: Together, these dual tracks eliminate the final regulatory pathways for adversary carriers to hand off transpacific or cross-border subsea capacity into U.S. domestic backbones—compelling consortiums to enforce offshore handoffs outside U.S. territory.
By pairing continuous lifecycle surveillance on international authorizations (FCC 26-74) with the proposed dismantling of domestic blanket authority and U.S. data center interconnections (FCC 26-29), the FCC has harmonized its Part 63 common-carrier rules with its submarine cable licensing regime—establishing an end-to-end national security perimeter from the subsea wet plant to the domestic Meet-Me Room.
