简体中文(中国) 
A comprehensive comparative analysis of the Subsea Cable Mandate (Paragraph 74) of the BRICS New Delhi Declaration against the Australia-India Cables Dialogue and the broader Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience, detailing India’s vendor security mandates, China's industrial monopoly, and tactical pathways for non-aligned subsea cooperation.
1. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration & Subsea Cable Mandate
The Leaders of BRICS countries, met in New Delhi, India, from 12 to 13 September 2026 for the XVIII BRICS Summit held under the theme: “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”.
On September 12, 2026, the BRICS grouping released the BRICS New Delhi Declaration, formalizing submarine cable infrastructure as an indispensable foundation for international digital sovereignty, inter-continental data routing, and network resilience across emerging markets, in addition to others.
Paragraph 74 of the BRICS New Delhi Declaration outlines the group's collective mandate:
"74. We acknowledge that submarine cable infrastructure for BRICS countries is an important foundation for international digital connectivity and network resilience. We appreciate the coordination of a dedicated Task Force that concluded the document “BRICS Cable Requirements: directive brief”, following the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of 2025, which welcomed the discussion of undertaking a “Technical and Economic Feasibility Study” for establishing a high-speed communication network through submarine cables between the BRICS countries. In this regard, we support continued dialogue and cooperation on voluntary basis among BRICS countries, in accordance with national circumstances and priorities. We further encourage the BRICS STI Steering Committee to continue this dialogue within the Task Force and propose the next steps for the feasibility study respecting national priorities and regulations and look forward to enhanced coordination between the BRICS ICT track and the STI track and prevent duplication of work for further progress."
2. The Australia-India Cables Dialogue & Western Alliance Alignment
In stark contrast to the BRICS multilateral framework, India's bilateral and minilateral subsea strategy is anchored in Western security alignments—most notably through the Australia-India Cables Dialogue (hosted in Perth and Mumbai) and the broader Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience.
Australia-India Cables Dialogue
Supported by a multi-year grant from Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), this dialogue maps supply chain vulnerabilities, expands landing points across the Indian Ocean, and addresses market concentration risks in manufacturing and repair fleets.
Quad Cable Initiatives
India coordinates directly with Australia, Japan, and the United States via Australia’s Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre to finance trusted Indo-Pacific infrastructure and advance Undersea Domain Awareness (UDA) protocols.
AUKUS-Adjacent Security Alignment
While AUKUS focuses on defense capabilities, its emphasis on seabed warfare, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and acoustic monitoring complements India’s strategic goal of securing critical undersea data highways in the Indian Ocean.
3. Strategic Matrix: BRICS Agenda vs. Western Cable Frameworks
| Strategic Dimension | BRICS Subsea Framework (New Delhi Declaration) | Australia-India Dialogue & Quad Framework |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Objective | Build non-Western digital infrastructure resilience and evaluate a "BRICS Cable" system between emerging markets. | Secure critical supply chains, protect seabed assets from state sabotage, and enforce trusted hardware standards. |
| Key Output | "BRICS Cable Requirements: directive brief" and joint STI/ICT technical feasibility studies. | Bilateral supply chain mapping, Quad subsea training programs, and joint Indian Ocean UDA protocols. |
| Vendor Stance | Open/Voluntary cooperation; implicit inclusion of Chinese industrial suppliers. | Strict exclusion of untrusted vendors under national security mandates; reliance on SubCom, ASN, and NEC. |
| Geopolitical Axis | Global South connectivity, multipolar data sovereignty, and alternative financing pathways. | Indo-Pacific security alignment (Quad/AUKUS-adjacent), Malacca Strait redundancy, and rules-based maritime order. |
4. The Industrial Dilemma: China's Monopoly vs. India's Security Directives
A fundamental structural contradiction exists within the BRICS subsea agenda: China is the only BRICS member state with turnkey trans-oceanic cable manufacturing and installation capabilities. Neither India, Russia, Brazil, nor South Africa possesses domestic optical fiber drawer facilities, high-voltage repeater factories, or major cable-laying fleets capable of deep-sea trans-oceanic builds.
Under the National Security Directive on Telecommunication Sector, Indian telecom operators are legally prohibited from integrating hardware into domestic networks unless certified by the National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC) via the Trusted Telecom Portal.
Due to ongoing geopolitical friction, Chinese suppliers—including HMN Tech—are barred from landing subsea cables on Indian territory or supplying core transmission gear for domestic landing stations.
If a unified BRICS cable system were built using Chinese technology, India could not legally permit the cable to land in Mumbai, Chennai, or Tuticorin without violating its own federal telecommunications security laws.
5. Operational Pathways for India's Dual-Track Strategy
India navigates this diplomatic balancing act—participating in BRICS dialogue while remaining strictly aligned with Western infrastructure security—through four distinct operational mechanisms:
- Multi-Vendor System Segmentation India supports architectural frameworks where a single BRICS cable network is built in separate operational segments. Western-trusted suppliers manufacture and lay segments terminating in India, while Chinese vendors handle separate segments between non-aligned landing points.
- Open-Access Interconnection at Neutral Hubs Rather than hosting a direct Chinese-built cable landing on its mainland, India connects to BRICS data streams at neutral third-party hubs (such as the UAE, Oman, or Singapore) via carrier-neutral, open-access handoffs.
- Focus on Software & Security Norms over Hardware Within the BRICS STI and ICT Steering Committees, India steers discussions away from joint physical procurement and toward software security, data localization norms, and cross-border cyber incident response.
- Exercise of Voluntary Clauses Paragraph 74 of the New Delhi Declaration explicitly states that cooperation occurs "on a voluntary basis... in accordance with national circumstances and priorities." This legal clause allows India to sign joint BRICS communiqués while opting out of physical infrastructure builds that conflict with its Quad commitments or domestic security directives.
By leveraging voluntary provisions in BRICS communiqués while maintaining strict "Trusted Source" vendor filtering at home, India preserves its diplomatic standing in the Global South without compromising its security alignment with Western allies across the Indo-Pacific subsea grid.
